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Browser-native Static Virtual Card For Online Transaction Security 
ABSTRACT 
Online transactions using credit cards are susceptible to fraud. This disclosure describes 
techniques to provide a browser-native implementation to dynamically bind a static virtual card 
(SVC) with a merchant server for an authorized period. When a user provides SVC credentials to 
an e-commerce merchant for completing a transaction, the SVC is authenticated at the merchant 
server by obtaining an authorization ID from the card issuer. The authorization ID has an 
associated expiration date. The browser native implementation allows accurate determination of 
the merchant domain and establishing binding between the SVC, the merchant ID, and the 
merchant domain for a specific period after which the binding is automatically removed. In this 
manner, a user has only one SVC associated with a payment card at any point in time that can be 
used with multiple merchants. The techniques improve credit card security while providing a 
simple user experience. 
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BACKGROUND 
Data breaches are increasingly common. While payment card networks have reduced in-
store fraud with chip and pin technology or tap and pay, there is no efficient solution for e-
commerce, without the merchant doing some integration work with the card processors. When a 
user shops online, the user needs to give out credit card credentials. Such credentials can be 
accessed and abused by fraudsters who hack into the merchant's servers and steal payment card 
numbers. It is important that users be provided security but in a non-disruptive and easy to use 
manner.  
Current e-commerce transactions can be classified into two categories: 
1. Transactions using tokens: A token is used for an e-commerce transaction instead of an 
actual credit card. This token has static as well as dynamic elements that make the 
transaction secure. For example, merchants can integrate with online payment or wallet 
systems to reduce credit card fraud by using tokenized cards. 
2. Transactions using actual card details: The actual credit card details, including the 
card number, expiry, and CVN, are used for the transaction.
To deal with frauds associated with the second category above, some financial 
institutions provide their customers with a Virtual Card Number (VCN) that uses new 
technologies, e.g., a browser extension, for security. However, a VCN is associated with a single 
merchant, thereby requiring users to manage VCNs associated with different merchants. Some 
financial institutions use cloud tokens, where a dynamic Card Verification Number (CVN) is 
generated each time the user attempts a transaction. However, merchants need additional 
technological capabilities to handle tokens correctly each time and may end up declining 
purchases.
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DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure describes mechanisms of generating a single Static Virtual Card (SVC) 
corresponding to a payment card and providing dynamic binding of the card to multiple 
merchants. A virtual card is a randomly-generated credit card credential delivered for payment 
on behalf of a user's static credit card. The SVC is provided via browser native integration. 
Fig. 1: Example process for dynamic binding of a static virtual card with a merchant 
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of the dynamic binding of an SVC with a merchant. A user 
that wishes to perform an online payment via a user device (102) requests [1] a static virtual card 
(SVC) number (104) from a card issuer (110). The SVC number, linked to the user, is delivered 
[2] to the user device. The user then visits a merchant's website using the device browser (106). 
To purchase a product, the user submits [3] the SVC credentials to the merchant server (108).  
The merchant server requests authorization [4] from the card issuer. The card issuer 
validates the SVC and returns an authorization ID [5] to the merchant server. The authorization 
request has a request date (“7/1/2020” in the example of Fig. 1). The authorization ID has an 
expiry date associated with it (“7/31/2020” in the example of Fig. 1). In this manner, a merchant 
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binding is established between the SVC, merchant ID, and merchant domain. The expiry date of 
the merchant binding can be different from the expiry of the SVC itself and is determined based 
on the expiry associated with the authorization code when the merchant first initiates a 
transaction authorization request.  
The authorization process aligns with and mimics the behavior of a standard card pre-
authorization request, where the merchant gets a certain number of days to initiate a capture 
request. For example, for a debit card, the expiry date of merchant binding is seven days. 
Similarly, for a credit card, the expiry date of merchant binding maybe thirty days. However, the 
merchant binding's expiry date may also depend on the card issuer and on merchant types. 
The user can use the same SVC credentials for e-commerce transactions with other 
merchants as well. A second merchant can go through the same steps as the first merchant, as 
described above. The second merchant server establishes a dynamic binding with the SVC with 
expiration determined by the expiry date associated with the authorization provided by the card 
issuer to the second merchant. Thus, the user does not require new SVC credentials for 
transactions with different merchants. 
The merchant binding is removed as soon as the expiry date arrives. When the merchant 
binding is about to expire, the user can be notified about the expiry. The expiry notification gives 
the user a chance to extend the expiry of binding in specific cases where the merchant needs 
more time to make additional transactions related to the purchase. To address split shipment 
cases, the techniques of this disclosure provide additional functionality to extend the expiry of 
the binding every time the merchant for the same SVC initiates a new pre-authorization request. 
The expiry in such cases can be extended to the new expiry date associated with the most recent 
authorization request.  
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The described techniques provide several advantages in preventing credit card fraud. 
Browser native implementation helps in determining the merchant domain accurately, even if the 
user utilizes a payment gateway in a different domain. Correctly identifying the merchant 
domain helps in having a precise binding of the SVC, merchant ID, and the merchant domain. 
Since there is only one SVC associated with a card at any point in time, the techniques discussed 
herein make it easier for users to manage SVCs. 
Dynamic expiry of merchant binding makes things stricter for the merchants where they 
can use an SVC only for the allotted period. Automatic expiry reduces the risk associated with 
the compromise of payment card data from the merchant’s database. A fraudster can only make 
successful transactions using SVCs that haven't expired. If a fraudster attempts a purchase on an 
expired SVC, the issuer can automatically decline the request. In case an SVC credential and 
merchant binding is compromised, a new SVC can be issued, invalidating all prior merchant 
bindings. 
CONCLUSION 
Online transactions using credit cards are susceptible to fraud. This disclosure describes 
techniques to provide a browser-native implementation to dynamically bind a static virtual card 
(SVC) with a merchant server for an authorized period. When a user provides SVC credentials to 
an e-commerce merchant for completing a transaction, the SVC is authenticated at the merchant 
server by obtaining an authorization ID from the card issuer. The authorization ID has an 
associated expiration date. The browser native implementation allows accurate determination of 
the merchant domain and establishing binding between the SVC, the merchant ID, and the 
merchant domain for a specific period after which the binding is automatically removed. In this 
manner, a user has only one SVC associated with a payment card at any point in time that can be 
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used with multiple merchants. The techniques improve credit card security while providing a 
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